In 1 Corinthians the apostle Paul is attempting to straighten out some people in his newly founded community who, by virtue of their possession of wisdom, were claiming a special spiritual status. Apparently they designated themselves as pneumatikoi in contrast with the psychikoi, or those of lesser religious achievement. By a careful reading of Paul's arguments in 1 Corinthians we can discern some of their key religious terminology and principles. On the basis of pertinent parallels to these terms and principles, especially in Hellenistic philosophical sources and Hellenistic Jewish texts, it is then possible to draw certain conclusions regarding the religious viewpoint of these Corinthians.

With regard to the pneumatikos-psychikos terminology, however, we are in an awkward situation. This is perhaps the most distinctive part of the language of these Corinthians. The pneumatikos/pneumatika terminology runs like a red thread through most of the main sections of Paul's argument directed at the Corinthians (i.e., in the major sections of the letter: chs. 1-4; 8-10; 12-14; 15). In 1 Cor 2:13-15, pneumatikoi refers to those capable of possessing special spiritual revelation or wisdom, in contrast to the psychikoi who do not have this ability. The same terms in 15:46-47 seem to refer to two different human beings or types of humanity which are respectively also "heavenly"
(ἐπουράνιος) and “earthly” (χοῖρος), the former having some sort of priority over the latter. In chs. 12-14 the pneumatika are clearly the special spiritual gifts such as glossolalia and ecstatic prophecy, and pneumatikos refers to the special standing of one who enjoys such spiritual gifts (14:37). In 10:1-4 the same term refers to the spiritual nourishment and benefits derived from key soteriological scriptural symbols spiritually understood. For this distinctive language so important for understanding the Corinthian situation, however, there is no convincing terminological parallel whatsoever in contemporary comparative material. Hence it has been difficult to determine the background of this language and its meaning for the Corinthians’ self-understanding.

I

The presence of the pneumatikos-psychikos terminology in 1 Cor 2 and 15 has been one of the main bases for arguing the Gnostic character of the “opponents” (or of Paul himself) in 1 Corinthians. Wilckens, following the lead of Reitzenstein, made such a case with the aid of Hermetic and Valentinian material. But the terms pneumatikos and psychikos do not even occur in the Poimandres. Nor does this “Gnostic” document maintain any anthropological distinction between “mind” (νοῦς, or “spirit” πνεῦμα) and “soul” (ψυχή) on the basis of which the adjectival usage could have developed. Indeed, “mind” and “soul” stand more in a parallel relationship than in a superior-inferior one.

Pearson has recently revived a proposal made previously by Dupont, namely that the pneumatic-psychic distinction developed out of the interpretation of Gen 2:7 in Hellenistic Judaism. Pearson’s form of the proposal finds in this Hellenistic-Jewish interpretation of Gen 2:7 both the origins of the


5Pearson, PNEUMATIKOS, esp. 11-12, 17-21; Dom Jacques Dupont, Gnosis: La connaissance religieuse dans les épîtres de Saint Paul (Paris: Gabalda, 1949) 172-80; see also the important review by Bultmann, JTS NS 3 (1952) 10-26, esp. 14-16.
pneumatikos-psychikos terminology and the theological background and context for this basic contrast found in 1 Cor 2:13-15 and 15:44-50. This argument, however, is based on some questionable contentions.

The specific terminology, the pneumatikos-psychikos contrast, does not occur in Philo or other Hellenistic Jewish writings. Similarly, neither Philo nor the Wisdom of Solomon makes any fundamental anthropological distinction between the “soul” (ψυχή) and the “spirit” (πνεῦμα), as the higher part of the soul, on the basis of which the adjectival usage might have developed. Nor is there any evidence in Philo and Wisdom that there is among Hellenistic Jews a preference for the term “spirit” (πνεῦμα) instead of “mind” (νοῦς) for the higher, rational part of the soul. Actually the terms “soul” (ψυχή), “spirit” (πνεῦμα),

6The term pneumatikos occurs by itself a very few times in Philo, and then with little or no religious significance: “pneumatic sinews” or “nerves” in Her. 242; Praem. 48; Aet. 125; in Op. 67 nature provides a “pneumatic” substance for the soul’s powers of sense-perception. Of greater interest here is Abr. 113: Sarah thinks the appearance of the visiting strangers is like “prophets or angels transferred from ‘spiritual’ and soul-like essence into human form” (note the parallel of “spiritual” and “soul”). It may be significant, however, that elsewhere Philo speaks of prophets and angels not as “spiritual” but as “ethereal” or “heavenly” beings. The term psychikos Philo uses dozens of times, almost always in a way that makes a metaphor or trope of the term it modifies. Thus food; death, light, house, wealth, passover, etc., are applied to the inner life of the soul—a meaning hardly helpful to Dupont’s and Pearson’s thesis. The usage is consistent and it is neutral in the sense that “psychic” never carries any pejorative connotations and there is no comparison with any higher aspect such as “spiritual” or “divine.” In other Greek-Jewish literature, the writings of the Septuagint in particular, pneumatikos and psychikos appear neither in paired contrast nor separately—with the one exception of the psychikos-somatikos pair in 4 Mace 1:32.

7Pearson’s method here is formally the same as that of Reitzenstein and Wilckens: attempting to explain the meaning of the pneumatikos-psychikos contrast on the basis of a contrast between the nouns pneuma and psychē, but he substitutes Hellenistic Judaism for Gnosticism.

8Indeed, no evidence is provided (Pearson, PNEUMATIKOS, 11) for this contention on which the rest of the argument depends. Eduard Schweizer’s comments (“Pneuma,” TDNT 6 [1968] 396) hardly support this contention. As Pearson contends, the use of pneumatikos for the highest religious status or the highest part of the self would be more understandable if πνεῦμα were used for the highest part of a person, in contrast to ψυχή as a lower part. However: Philo uses πνεῦμα very rarely with respect to the higher soul (a dozen times, vs. hundreds for νοῦς and διάνοια), and then it is not instead of, but in close
“mind” (νοῦς or διάνοια), “rational soul” (λογικὴ ψυχή), etc. are largely parallel or interchangeable in Philo and Wisdom.

In Wis 15:11 (cf. 15:8 and 16) “soul” and “spirit” are parallel, without distinction in meaning. In 2:22-3:1 it is “soul,” not “spirit,” used in reference to man as created for incorruption, as an “image” (εἰκὼν) of God’s own eternity. In 9:15 psyche and pneumā are parallel, synonymous terms for the soul which the corruptible, earthly body weighs down. There is no indication in Wisdom of any distinction between these terms in use and meaning, let alone between higher and lower parts of the soul expressed in these terms. In Wisdom the basic anthropological and soteriological divisions lie between the soul and the body, and between the wise, righteous souls and the foolish, unrighteous souls.

Philo’s treatises display the same interchangeability of terms. In certain contexts he distinguishes between the “mind” in the soul, its dominant part, and the soul as a whole. But in Op. 135; Leg. all. 3.161; Som. 1.34,9 and other interpretations of Gen 2:7, the basic division lies between body and soul, while the terms “soul” and “mind” (νοῦς or διάνοια) are used virtually interchangeably. In these texts the “divine spirit” (θεῖον πνεῦμα) or the “spirit of life” (πνεῦμα ζωῆς) is the substance (οὐσία) or the means by which this soul or mind is constituted. In Op. 135 the terms for the immortal part of a person composed of divine spirit are both “soul” and “mind” (διάνοια), in Leg. all. 3.161 it is “soul,” and in Som. 134 it is “mind” (νοῦς). In the latter two connection with the other terms and usually as the essence of the rational soul. Wisdom uses πνεῦμα interchangeably with ψυχῆ. In Wis 15:11 this is in an allusion to Gen 2:7. But this usage of πνεῦμα is not necessarily related to interpretation of Gen 2:7. The translation of the Hebrew ruah surely provides one of the roots of this usage. Ps 77:3, 6 and Job 32:8, 18 are two examples where the context is contemplation of God or the possession of wisdom. Philo’s use of Stoic philosophical language accords with his usage in Jewish exegetical traditions. He closely associates and nearly identifies ψυχῆ, νοῦς, and πνεῦμα: the spirit in the heart generates thoughts, Spec. leg. 1.6; the mind is the πνεῦμα ἐνθερμὸν, Fug. 134; cf. Som. 1:30; cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.157; Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (ed. J. von Arnim) 2, frg. 96 and frg. 838.

9 Like those from Wisdom cited in the previous paragraph, these are passages which Pearson (PNEUMATIKOS, 18-20) uses to explain the origins of the pneumatikos-psychikos terminology.
passages "soul" and "mind" respectively are identified as "a divine fragment," (απόσπασμα θεον). In Plant. 18-20 the term for the higher part of a person, the part made according to the Image of God, the Archetype, the Logos of the First Cause, is "soul" or "rational soul." "Spirit" in this passage is not the rational part of the soul, but rather "that Divine and Invisible Spirit."

In several different contexts (e.g., Det. 79-95; Her. 54-57; Spec. leg. 4.123) Philo draws a distinction between the vital soul which humans share with animals and the rational soul whose essence or source or archetype is the Divine Spirit or Logos. His use of this distinction in various contexts indicates that for Philo and the branch of Judaism he represents this is a standard exegetical tradition. It was developed partly (perhaps even primarily) to clarify any seeming discrepancies between Lev 17:11 (blood as the essence of the soul) on the one hand, and Gen 1:26-27 and 2:7 (spirit as the essence of the soul, which is made according to the Divine Image, the Logos) on the other. The higher, dominant (part of the) soul is called variously νοῦς, λόγος, άνθρωπος, λογισμός, νοερά καὶ λογικὴ ψυχή. πνεύμα is usually stated as "the essence" of this rational soul. The distinction, however, is not between a mortal soul and an immortal spirit but between the soul of blood (or flesh) and the soul whose essence is spirit. In Det. 79-90 that which Moses "names" spirit is the soul.

Thus the terminological evidence in Philo, like that in Wisdom, will not support the contention that Philo maintains a basic contrast between mortal soul and immortal spirit. Philo's various interpretations of Gen 2:7 are no different from the rest of his writing in this regard. They provide neither the actual language of the pneumatikos-psychikos distinction nor the anthropological division between pneuma and psyche on which such language might be based. The fundamental anthropological division for Philo lies between mortal body and the immortal soul. And, in these exegeses of Gen 2:7, following precisely the implication of the text of 2:7b, the (divine) Spirit is the means or the essence by which the soul becomes immortal.

Philo does use πνεύμα once for "the dominant part of ourselves," Spec. leg. 1.171, where the abbreviated form of this traditional exegetical distinction may account for the expression: τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν λογικὸν πνεύμα. Cf. Spec. leg. 1.277.

Pearson, PNEUMATIKOS, 18-20.
Although it may not be possible to determine the precise origins of the *pneumatikos-psyikos* terminology, it may be possible to establish the background and meaning of this highly significant contrast by broadening our approach to include other, parallel language used by the Corinthians. With such a broadened approach we can profitably return to Hellenistic Jewish interpretation of Gen 2:7. For there are in Philo other standard interpretations of Gen 2:7 besides that contrasting the soul of spirit with the soul of blood. And one of these in particular is directly relevant to 1 Corinthians 15:44-50 and may elucidate the significance of the *pneumatikos-psyikos* contrast in both 1 Corinthians 2 and 15.

Just as the *pneumatikos-psyikos* contrast in 1 Cor 2:6-3:4 is parallel to that of “the perfect” vs. “children” (τέλειοι vs. νήπιοι) so it is parallel in 1 Cor 15:44-50 to the contrast between “the *anthrōpos* of heaven” and “the *anthrōpos* of earth” or “dust.” The Corinthians whom Paul is attempting to “straighten out” in 1 Corinthians 15 are apparently thinking of the *pneumatikos* and the *psyikos* respectively as the person of heaven and the person of earth or as two types of humanity, the heavenly and the earthly. As noted above, an anthropological dualism of immortal spirit and mortal soul expressed in terms of the *pneumatikos-psyikos* contrast as an exegesis of Gen 2:7 is not attested in extant texts of Hellenistic Jewish theology. Such an exegesis would have to distinguish basically between the two clauses of Gen 2:7b, i.e., between the “breath of life” and the “living soul.” But the Philonic interpretations of Gen 2:7 already examined, and the corresponding allusions in *Wisdom*, divide basically between 2:7a and 2:7b, i.e., between the body of earth or dust and the soul of spirit. The latter distinction, however, points to two things directly relevant to the Corinthian contrast between the two types of human being. (1) The conceptual apparatus for these interpretations of Gen 2:7 is a fundamental duality expressed in terms of earthly-heavenly, mortal-immortal, body-soul, blood-spirit, basically the same contrasts which appear in 1 Cor 15:44-
54 in connection with Gen 2:7 (e.g., Philo Her. 55-56, Op. 135; Leg. all. 3.161; cf. Wis 2:23-3:4; 9:15; 15:11). (2) Moreover, in Philo all of the terms used to express this duality are also used in explanation of a fundamental contrast between two types of humanity, a contrast based on the two creation texts, Gen 1:26-27 and 2:7a. It is this other particular interpretation of Gen 2:7 (and 1:27),\(^\text{14}\) this contrast between two types of humankind, which may elucidate the pneumatikos-psychikos contrast.

This distinction between the heavenly *anthrōpos* and the earthly *anthrōpos* was probably current prior to Philo.\(^\text{15}\) Scholars, such as Brandenburger, who are influenced by the "history of religions" approach often take the Philonic heavenly *anthrōpos* as a reference to "The Primal Man" (*Urmensch*).\(^\text{16}\) As Colpe points out, however, this concept of Primal Man is a synthetic scholarly construct designed to comprehend a variety of material, is historically imprecise, and is inconsistently applied by many scholars.\(^\text{17}\) More particularly, the notion of a Gnostic or proto-Gnostic "Primal Man" has little descriptive or interpretative potential for any Philonic material and is hardly appropriate to Philo's texts on the heavenly *anthrōpos*. The latter figure in Philo bears no connotations of a macrocosmic Anthropos or of the *god* Anthropos. The Logos is once called "God's Man" in response to the "one man" in Gen 42:11, and is once called a "second god" (*Conf.* 41; 62; *Q.G.* 2.62). Philo once calls the cosmos "a great and perfect *anthrōpos*" (*Mig.* 220), but he says nothing to suggest that this is in some way identical with the heavenly *anthrōpos*. Of the different characteristics of the composite concept *Urmensch* as delineated by K. Rudolf,\(^\text{18}\) some are appli-

\(^{14}\)It is evident that in Philo's writings we have to contend with a variety of different—and not necessarily related or consistent—interpretations of a given text or scriptural symbol. Philo's treatises display several standard interpretations or uses (a) of Gen 1:26-27 or parts thereof, (b) of Gen 2:7 or parts thereof, and (c) of combinations of parts of Gen 1:26-27 and 2:7. Jacob Jervell, *Imago Dei* [FRLANT 58; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960] 52-70 has attempted a simplified presentation of this complex Philonic material. Since he is concerned primarily with the *imago dei*, however, he does not distinguish all of the discrete exegetical traditions which Philo uses and combines, although he comments on some of them.


\(^{17}\)See Carsten Colpe, *Die religionsgeschichtliche Schule* (FRLANT 78; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961) 171-97; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 284-83, agrees but continues to use the concept anyhow.

cable to one or another Philonic figure, while others are not applicable to any figure at all. For example, neither the Logos/Sophia nor the heavenly *anthrôpos* seem to qualify as a redeemer in any usual sense of the concept. The motif of descent and ascent pertains only to the individual soul (and *not* to the heavenly *anthrôpos*), which comes to sojourn in earthly-bodily reality but then returns to its heavenly home. In terms of *Urmensch*, the best we could salvage—and even this would be almost sheer speculation on our part—would be an androgynous heavenly figure who was the image (vs. “after the Image”) of God at the pre-Philonic stage, but certainly *not* the same as the heavenly *anthrôpos* in Philo.19

What we do find in Philo repeatedly is a fundamental distinction between two types of human being, the heavenly and the earthly. The distinction between the two types is dominated by the contrast between the *anthrôpos made* after the image and the one *molded* out of earth.20 The basic terms in this contrast depend on Gen 1:27 (“made” and “after the Image”) and 2:7 (“clay,” “out of earth,” and “molded”) respectively. Philo, moreover, uses this distinction primarily to explain a number of enigmas perceived in the text of Genesis 2. It would appear, therefore, that Philo (and his predecessors) found in the Biblical creation account two different types of humankind and that these had become a standard concept in his religious tradition.

(citation of Gen 2:7) There are two types of human being (*άνθρωπος*): the one heavenly, the other earthly. The heavenly *anthrôpos*, being made after the Image of God, is altogether without part or lot in corruptible and earthly substance; but the earthly one was compacted out of the matter scattered here and there, which Moses calls “clay.” For this reason he says that the heavenly *anthrôpos* was not molded, but was stamped with the Image of God; while the earthly is a molded work of the Artificer, but not His offspring.21

19That is, this is the most we can conclude once we recognize the Philonic distinctions which Brandenburger (*Adam*, 118-23) either overlooked or discounted. Brandenburger’s claim to find the Primal Man in Philonic material will not stand up to a more careful examination of the Philonic passages on which he bases it. The weak link in the argument is on pp. 122-23. F.-W. Eltzerer (*Eikon im Neuen Testament* [BZNW 23; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1958]) on whom Brandenburger relies, is not always accurate in his reading of Philo. See further the warning in Jervell, *Imago Dei*, 65-66.

20See *Op*. 134; *Leg. all. 1*. 131, 53, 88-95, 2.4; *Plant. 44*; *Q. G.* 1.4, 8; 2.56; *Q. E.* 2.46; *Her.* 57. The “heavenly” vs. “earthly” human beings occur in *Leg. all. 1*. 31 and 90-95, and the “two types of humankind” in *Leg. all. 1*. 31 and 2.4.

21*Leg. all. 1*. 31. In this and subsequent quotations from Philo, I have relied upon the translation by Colson and Whitaker (LCL), while adapting toward consistency of English terminology and contextual meaning.
In this and related texts (such as Op. 134;22 Leg. all. 1.53, 88, 90-92; 2.4, etc.) we have paralleled all of the basic language of 1 Cor 15:44-54 except the pneumatikos-psychikos terminology. Moreover, this language is all centered around the basic contrast between two types of human: the heavenly anthrōpos vs. the earthly anthrōpos, who are, respectively, incorruptible vs. corruptible and immortal vs. mortal. There is also here, in an exegesis of Gen 2:7, the language of “after the image” from Gen 1:27, the Image for Philo being the Logos (Sophia) of God, in accordance with which the heavenly anthrōpos is created. Philo, furthermore, is concerned with the priority of the heavenly over the earthly. In Leg. all. 2.4 the earthly anthrōpos is explicitly called the “second,”23 although more important is the priority implicit in the comparison whereby the heavenly type is clearly superior in ontological status and value to the earthly. The latter is merely the molded work of the Creator but not the offspring of the divine, and is even said to be mortal by nature (Op. 134). It is evident that Paul’s polemical argument in 1 Cor 15:44-54, with the pointed transformation of his “opponents’” view of the priority in 15:46, could be readily understood as directed against such a distinction between two types of humanity.

But Philo’s exposition of the two types is much more elaborate and reveals the further significance of the contrast. Philo tends to understand anthrōpos allegorically as referring to “mind,” or the highest part of the soul. Accordingly he finds that the heavenly anthrōpos and the earthly anthrōpos refer to two different kinds of mind: the earth-born and body-loving mind and the mind existing after the Image, which has no share in corruptible earthly reality (esp. Leg. all. 1.31-33; 2.4-5; cf. Leg. all. 1.53-55; 88-89; 90-95; Plant. 44-45). The soteriological significance of the symbolism now begins to emerge. In Leg. all. 1.53-55 and 88-89 Philo indicates that the mind made after the Image God deems worthy of three gifts of which natural ability consists: facility of

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22Op. 134, however, appears to be a special case (so also Jervell, Imago Dei, 53) which does little more than make the usual Platonic distinction between the intelligible form or idea of man and sense-perception or empirical man. Focusing on Op. 134, a text frequently cited in references to 1 Cor 15:44-54, tends to divert us from Philo’s usual understanding of the heavenly anthrōpos vs. the earthly anthrōpos, leading us either to false distinctions (such as “the idea man” vs. “the historical Adam”—Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 286) or to dismissing the distinction as merely Philo’s Platonic form of thinking.

23The order in which the two creation accounts of humans are presented in the Biblical account just happens to correspond with Philo’s more basic pattern of priority.
apprehension, persistence (practicing noble actions), and memory (retention of holy doctrines). The molded mind, on the other hand, can only apprehend well. It neither retains nor practices good things, and is soon cast out of the garden. But upon the anthrōpos whom God provides with secure knowledge, i.e., the pure mind which has no share in corruptible matter, He also bestows the ability to practice and to remember or guard the virtues and doctrines.

In these passages the contrast between the two types of human being emerges as a qualitative distinction between people of two different levels of religious-ethical ability and achievement. The heavenly type of humanity or mind, by virtue of the abilities granted by God, or by virtue of its origin after the Image, the Logos/Sophia, has achieved immortality and is secure in its heavenly status. The earthly mind, however, because of its attachment to earthly and bodily realities, is thus played upon by forces drawing it in opposite directions and given the high calling to decide between them, that it might be moved to choose and to shun, to win fame and immortality should it welcome the better, and to incur a dishonorable death should it choose the worse (Plant. 44-45).

It is also noteworthy that the distinction between the soul of blood (Lev 17:11) and the soul of Spirit (Gen 2:7b) discussed above is developed by Philo into this same contrast between human types,

the one that of those who live by reason, the Divine Spirit, the other of those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh. This last is a molded clod of earth, the other is the faithful impress of the Divine Image (Her. 54-57).

24The Greek words are εὐφυΐα, εὐϕυία, ἐπιμονή, μνήμη. εὐφυΐα is an Aristotelian term used inclusively of natural and moral goodness. εὐϕυία is attested almost exclusively in Philo and in this context. It surely connotes more than "cleverness, tact" (so LSJ)! The Neoplatonic metaphorical use of θίξις in the sense of the apprehension of the mind probably leads us in the right direction. Ironically enough, Colson and Whitaker (LCL) do better on εὐθίξια ("facility in apprehending") than on ἐπιμονή and μνήμη in their paraphrase based on contextual usage.

25Can Wis 4:1-5 be understood as an independent witness to the particular Jewish theological tradition on which Philo is here drawing? There is immortality in the remembrance of virtue (μνήμη ἀπερτῆς), but the impious (of the two kinds of anthrōpoi here in Wisdom) are unable to persist, even though they may blossom with virtue for a season.
Two additional passages (Q.G. 2.56 and Q.E. 2.46) elucidate even more clearly how the two *anthrōpoi* function as paradigms or prototypes for devout Jews of different religious levels. In Q.G. 2.56, because the blessing given Noah in Gen 9:1-2 parallels that given to the man made in Gen 1:27-28, Noah is equal in honor, not with the molded and earthly *anthrōpos*, but with the one made in the likeness of God. The heavenly *anthrōpos* here serves as a paradigm into which a scriptural hero of righteousness is set in the interpretation of his destiny and his significance for the faith. This passage also illustrates a general typological pattern: as the prototype or paradigm, so are those who belong to that type or paradigm. Thus Philo exhorts the souls of intelligent people to follow the paradigm of Noah and the *anthrōpos* made in the Image. The same typological pattern of thought is expressed in other passages as well when the lower prototype, "the earthly mind called Adam," is contrasted with those who belong to the higher type, "the truly alive having Sophia for their Mother" (Her. 52-53), or "the people endowed with sight" (Plant. 44-46).

When Philo makes a distinction between the contemplative race, or faithful adherents of Jewish religious communities in general, and the prophetic type of people who are "called above" as initiates into the divine mysteries (Q.E. 2.46), he is quite clearly speaking to actual communities of devout Jews. That is, he is addressing Jewish communities which (like the community Paul addresses in Corinth) contain an elite of exalted spiritual status, in distinction from the ordinary believers. The "contemplative race," or ordinary faithful Jews, has indeed considerable value to God. Its election is comparable to the ordering of the world and the creation of the earth-born molded human, to all of which is assigned the symbolic number "6." Yet the "calling above" of the prophetic type, symbolized by Moses, is an origin (and destiny) superior to that of the molded humanity's corruptible mixture with the body and earth, and is rather ethereal and incorporeal in accord with the ever-virginal Hebdomad, i.e., Sophia/Logos.26

From these several Philonic passages it is clear that the heavenly

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26In this passage both Moses and the *anthrōpos* after the Image are juxtaposed with the symbolism of the Hebdomad, important in Philo and elsewhere in Hellenistic Judaism (cf. Aristobulus in Eusebius Praep. Ev. IX. 667a-668b). For Philo the perfect number, Seven, symbolizes Light-Logos-Sophia and thus the human mind insofar as the Holy Logos of the Hebdomad comes upon the soul and replaces the Six and its mortal things (cf., Leg. all. 1.15-18; Q.G. 2.41).
anthrópos and the earthly anthrópos, the two types of humanity, are paradigms, based in creation texts, of different levels of religious endowment or status in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition represented by Philo.

The argument thus far should perhaps be summarized briefly. We cannot account for the pneumatikos-psychikos terminology in 1 Corinthians on the basis of any of the comparative literature previously suggested. Even the Hellenistic Jewish texts which Pearson adduces do not show a distinction between mortal soul and immortal spirit from which, supposedly, the terminology was derived. But Dupont and Pearson have pointed in the right direction. The pneumatikos-psychikos language is part of or parallel to a fundamental contrast between two types of human being, heavenly and earthly, immortal and mortal, which Paul argues against polemically in 1 Cor 15:44-54. This same fundamental cosmological-soteriological contrast is found in Philo's writings generally, but particularly in the explanations of the two types of humanity based on Gen 1:27 and 2:7a, respectively. Only the specific terminology, pneumatikos-psychikos, is missing. It would appear, then, that the Corinthians used pneumatikos-psychikos along with the rest of these terms to make the same basic contrast between people of different levels of spiritual ability and attainment, different religious types of people, for whom the heavenly anthrópos and the earthly anthrópos were paradigmatic symbols in Philo.

III

Analysis of the Corinthians' language behind 1 Corinthians 1-4 leads to the same result. The actual terminology of pneumatikos-psychikos is not found in Philo. But the other language of the Corinthians discerned through 1 Corinthians 1-4, especially the "perfect vs. child" contrast which is parallel to the pneumatikos-psychikos distinction (1 Cor 2:6-3:4), is adequately and comprehensively paralleled only in Philo. Thus again, the Hellenistic Jewish tradition he represents provides the analogy for understanding the Corinthians' religious language.

The distinction between "perfect" and "child," which is adequately paralleled only in Philo, is important and central language in his treatises. Philo makes frequent distinctions between different classes of people or levels of religious status, sometimes distinguishing two, sometimes three classes or levels.

He makes one twofold distinction between the extremes, the wise or perfect or good person as opposed to the foolish or bad or evil person (σοφός, τέλειος, ἀστείος, σπουδαῖος vs. ἄφρων, φαύλος, κακός). He makes another twofold distinction between the wise and perfect as the highest religious status and the child or practicer or one making progress at a lower level of achievement (νήπιος, ἀσκήτης, ὁ προκόπτων). The threefold distinction, in effect, juxtaposes these twofold distinctions, situating the babes or practicers in between the two extremes with the possibility of moving in either direction.

Thus the teleios-nēpios language is important to Philo's determination of these different levels of soteriological status or achievement. The "solid food" and "milk" refer, as part of this same set of terms, to the different diets appropriate to the respective levels.

And who also could the anthrōpos in each of us be except the mind, who is to reap the benefits from what is sown or planted? But since food for children is milk, and for mature (perfect) people is cake, there must also be as milk-like foods for the soul during its infancy, the elementary education of school studies, and as foods for mature people instruction through wisdom and moderation and all virtue (Agr. 8-9).

Philo's primary concern is with the individual soul or mind and its attainment of perfection. Sometimes he speaks of the process leading toward perfection in terms of a three-stage scheme: beginnings, progress, and perfection (e.g., Leg. all. 3.159; Agr. 165). From some passages (e.g., Agr. 157-65) it is clear that these terms refer to stages of religious achievement undergone or experienced by pious (Alexandrian) Jews. "Perfection" was a spiritual status which could be reached and established ever more firmly during the soul's sojourn in the body as it attained an ever more intimate relation with Sophia. This language of perfect vs. child is integral to Philo's more extensive exposition of what might be termed patterns of perfection, whose paradigms are the great patriarchs, such as Abraham or Jacob.

28 See further, e.g., Quod. omn. prob. 160; Congr. 19; Agr. 157-62; Mig. 28-33; 36-40; Sob. 9-10; Som. 2.10-11, 234-36; Leg. all. 1.90-94. Cf., in NT writings, Heb 5:12-14.

29 Abraham is a symbol of the nascent sophos who sojourns with Hagar or school studies as preparation for becoming teleios and possessed of Sarah or Sophia (Arete); Jacob symbolizes the practicer who eventually attains the vision of God, symbolized by the name Israel (e.g., Leg. all. 3.244; Congr. 154; Q. G. 3.20). Erwin Goodenough has laid out these patterns of perfection clearly and sympathetically in By Light, Light (New Haven: Yale University, 1935), chs. V, VI, and VIII, and esp. pp. 136-52, on Abraham.
A further aspect of this language in Philo, however, is even more particularly pertinent to the Corinthian situation, where Paul found this language of different religious status linked with a divisiveness in the community. Although the *teleios-nēpios* terminology may designate the stages along the process leading to spiritual perfection, the effect of this and related language is to make sharp distinctions between the abilities of the two levels. The wise and perfect are able to transcend the body and psychic passions, while those making progress can only check their effects on the higher self (e.g., *Leg. all.* 3.131-44). The *teleios* receives perfect goods from God without having to "toil," while the child or "ascetic" acquires virtue only through toil and cannot thus reach perfection (e.g., *Leg. all.* 3.135). The situation of training, that of the children, is clearly an inferior status. The higher religious ideal is to become perfect or wise. This involves leaving behind the merely infantile and milk-like teachings to feed on Sophia herself. The wise thus come to possess the perfect good and immortality. In fact, the perfect attain such an exalted position as to be changing their ontological status, from corruptible to uncreated nature, whereas those making progress lie merely on the border between the living and the dead (*Som.* 2.234-36). The distinction between these two levels of spiritual achievement is often so sharply drawn that the perfect and the children are separated into two distinct groups.

These are two companies (θίασοι) as leaders of which Moses introduces Isaac and Joseph. The noble company is led by Isaac who learns from no teacher but himself, absolutely disdaining to make use of soft and milky food suited to infants and little children, and using only strong nourishment fit for grown people. . . . The company which yields and is ready to give in is led by Joseph, for he . . . is thoughtful for the well-being of the body also. . . and is drawn in different directions. . . and can never attain to fixity (*Som.* 2.10-11; cf. *Sob.* 9-10).

The Philonic parallels, furthermore, extend beyond the terminology of "perfect vs. babes" to nearly all of the Corinthians' self-designations which can be discerned through 1 Cor 1-4. Judging from Paul's polemical or even sarcastic comments in 1 Cor 1:26 and 4:8-10 the same Corinthians who understood themselves as the wise, perfect, and spiritual, as opposed to the foolish, babes, and psychics, also used terminology such as "nobly born, rich, kings, glorious" (εὐγενής, πλούσιος, βασιλεύς, ἐνδόξος), etc., in reference to their exalted status. As with the *teleios-nēpios* contrast, Philo provides an analogous use of these terms on the basis of which we may better understand the
Corinthians. Indeed separately or together, these terms are found throughout some of the same passages in which the teleios-nēpios language is used and can hardly be avoided. True nobility, wealth, honor, kingship, etc., are possessions of the soul (the teleios or the sophos) secure in its own proper spiritual existence. As with teleios in the teleios-nēpios contrast, the designations of "wise," "nobly born," "king," etc., refer to a spiritual elite. This elite is often quite explicitly contrasted with the foolish and wicked. But in many passages there is also a contrast between the elite who possess wisdom and thereby are rich, well-born, kings, glorious, and those merely of lesser religious achievement. One of these same passages, Virt. 174, also indicates that some of those who characterized themselves as rich, nobly-born, strong, and knowledgeable, appeared arrogant even to others (Philo) who valued such characterizations of the sophos. It is not only Paul who finds a potential arrogance in those who enjoyed the exalted spiritual status expressed in such terms—and the divisive implications are again quite evident.

We have found, therefore, that both of the sets of language to which the pneumatikos-psychikos terminology is parallel in 1 Corinthians function prominently in Philo’s writings as important expressions of different types of men or of different levels of religious achievement. The Philonic analogy, however, goes one step further. For these two sets of language are fused at points in Philo’s writings.

30Philo, of course, has appropriated this set of terminology from Hellenistic philosophy, where it was standard at least among the Stoics, e.g., Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (ed. J. von Arnim) 3.85-89, 150-57. Jewish wisdom theology prior to Philo had long since expressed the relation between the wise man and Sophia in the same or similar terms: see, e.g., Prov 8-9; 8:18; Sir 4:11-13; 11:1; 15:5-6; Wis 5:16; 7:7-8; 8:3, 5, 10, 17-18. 31In fact Philo devotes the last sub-section of the treatise De virtutibus (187-227) to the subject "Concerning Noble Birth," the most striking passage of which (211-19) discusses Abraham, inspired by the divine Spirit, as a paradigm of perfection and kingship (although he was a commoner, ἰδιώτης, cf. Paul’s charge against the Corinthians, 1 Cor 1:26-27) as well as of noble birth. Pearson (PNEUMATIKOS, 40) notices at least the "noble-birth" in this key passage and devotes an excursus to this spiritual quality.

32Perhaps it will suffice to quote only one of the many pertinent texts:

For the wise person is a friend of God rather than a servant. . . . But he who has this allotment has passed beyond the bounds of human happiness. He alone is nobly born (εὐγενής). . . . not only rich, but all rich (οὐ πλούσιος, ἀλλὰ πάμπλουτος). . . . not merely of high repute, but glorious (οὐκ ἐνδοξος, ἀλλ' εὐλαμμής) . . . sole king (μόνος βασιλεύς) . . . sole freeman (μόνος ἑλέθερος) . . . Sob. 56.

See further, e.g., Mig. 197; Som. 2.242-44; Virt. 8; Sac. 43-44; Sob. 55-57.
Indeed, in *Leg. all.* 1.90-95 Philo expresses the contrast between the heavenly *anthrōpos* and the earthly *anthrōpos* in terms of his general distinctions of two and three levels of religious endowment, more particularly in the language of perfect vs. child. Philo interprets “Adam” in Gen 2:16-17 as the name of the molded *anthrōpos*: “Call him ‘earth.’” Thus Adam means the earthly and corruptible mind (*γῆινος καὶ φθαρτὸς νοῦς*), for the mind after the Image is not earthly but heavenly. Now it is to this Adam, the earthly mind, and not to the *anthrōpos* after the Image, that God gives the command.

For the latter, even without urging, possesses virtue instinctively; but the former, independently of instruction, could have no part in wisdom.

The distinction which is implicit here, that between the perfect and the child, Philo proceeds to make quite explicit.

There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect person formed after the Image (τῷ τελείῳ τῷ κατ’ εἰκόνα), for none of these does the perfect person require. The bad person has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child (νήπιος) of exhortation and teaching. . . . Quite naturally, then, does (God) command and exhort the earthly mind who is neither bad nor good but midway between these (Leg. all. 1.90-95).

In this passage Philo fuses or identifies the contrast between the two human types with the standard distinction in levels of religious status. The heavenly *anthrōpos* and the earthly *anthrōpos* are the same, respectively, as the *teleios* and the *nēpios*.

As the Philonic analogy to the language and religious viewpoint of the Corinthians becomes more complete, it is becoming also more coherent and compact. According to the Philonic analogy, Hellenistic Jews, at least in this particular tradition, made distinctions (1) between different levels of spiritual status, expressed in the *teleios-nēpios* contrast and related terminology, and (2) between two types of humanity, heavenly vs. earthly, immortal vs. mortal. Since these distinctions are parallel if not identical, it is not surprising to find that the Corinthians were using another, similar set of terminology, the *pneumatikos-psychikos* distinction, in connection with both.

IV

It is quite clear from what Paul says in 1 Cor 1-2 that the claim to special spiritual status by some Corinthians, and the resultant
dissensions in the community, were connected with those Corinthians’ obsession with *sophia*. Similarly in Philo, all the language of exalted religious status revolves around *sophia*, the divine agent of salvation as well as of creation. For it is through possession of *sophia* that the soul attains exalted status as perfect, nobly-born, rich, king, immortal, heavenly (e.g., *Mig.* 26-40; *Q.G.* 4.46). The Philonic analogy, however, has not been adequately pursued for the light it may shed on the significance of the *pneumatikos-psychikos* and related language of the Corinthians. Wilckens perceives that for the Corinthian “opponents” Sophia is a personified divine figure. But he obscures the issue by suggesting that they had also identified Sophia with the exalted Christ, and he does not really pursue the Philonic material beyond the only Philonic image for Sophia (“the royal way”) which could possibly fit with the “Redeemer-myth” model which he is following. Pearson, perhaps reacting against Wilckens’ focus on Sophia as divine person, concentrates on “sophia as content” and, similarly, does not pursue the Philonic analogy. A more comprehensive pursuit of this Philonic analogy may further elucidate the significance of the *pneumatikos-psychikos* terminology and other language of differential religious status.

In the earlier development of the Jewish wisdom tradition *hokmäh/sophia* had become the focus of Jewish piety. Wisdom had become identical with the Torah or Law, and was the very content of salvation and true religion. The whole section of Wisdom, chs. 6-10, is a poetic panegyricon on Sophia as a divine figure, the consort of the *sophos* and agent of his immortality as

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33 Wilckens (*Weisheit*, 5-11) makes this quite clear.
34 Helmut Koester’s review (*Gnomon* 33 [1961] 590-95) and Carsten Colpe’s review, (*Monatsschrift für Pastoraltheologie* 52 [1963] 487-93) must be used along with Wilckens’ exegesis in order to make sense out of the polemical situation in 1 Corinthians. That Sophia, for the Corinthian “opponents,” is a personified divine figure is clear, likewise that Sophia is their salvation-content. This does not mean that they also identified Sophia with the exalted Christ (in the sense of the Gnostic redeemer, according to Wilckens), see Koester, 591-92. It is Paul who makes the identification: the true wisdom of God is the historical person, the crucified man, Jesus Christ. Conzelmann (*1 Corinthians*, ad. loc.) does not really clarify the polemical situation with respect to *sophia* in 1 Cor 1-2.
35 Wilckens, *Weisheit*, 139-59, following J. Pascher, Ἡ ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΗ ΟΔΟΣ (Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums 17; Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1931); cf. Colpe’s review of Wilckens.
36 When he comes to direct discussion of *sophia*, Pearson (*PNEUMATIKOS*, 30-32) moves away from the Philonic material, although he does base his interpretation of *sophia* as *pneuma* on Wis 7:22 and 9:17 and fragments of Aristobulus, as well as one Philonic phrase from *Gig.* 47.
well as the consort of God. Similarly, in Philo's writings Sophia, or her equivalent, the divine Logos, is the mediator of creation and especially the means and substance of the soul's salvation. Sophia (Logos), perpetually understood as a divine personal figure, is either the wife (spouse) or the mother of the wise. As the divine spring (Fug. 177-202; Post. 124-319), the spiritual banquet (Som. 1:47-51; 198-200; Fug. 137-38, 166-67; Cong. 172-74), and the "royal way" (Post. 101-02; Quod. Deus. 140-80), Sophia is the means or agent of spiritual achievement and security for the wise and perfect. As the divine spring and spiritual banquet, Sophia is also the substance of salvation, the divine nourishment or knowledge. And as the divine land which the sophoi or teleioi attain (Mig. 28-30, 45-46; Her. 313-15), Sophia is the soteriological object or goal. It is apparent from such passages that Philo conceives of sophia both as the content of wisdom possessed by the wise and perfect and as the means or agent by which the perfect come to possess the content. This pattern becomes quite explicit at points. Most directly pertinent to our analogy for the Corinthians perhaps are the "by Sophia, Sophia" passages such as Her. 98; Mig. 39; and Q.G. 4.101: thus the wise who desire wisdom "God has entirely approved and has made perfect in the knowledge of Sophia by his Sophia" (cf. 1 Cor 1:21). For Philo, as for Wisdom, the divine figure Sophia (Logos) has rather comprehensive functions. Soteriologically all depends and focuses on Sophia.

Since Hellenistic Jewish piety of this tradition is thus centered on Sophia, the differences in religious status are due to differences in relationship with Sophia. In fact, the respective relationships are strikingly contrasted in Philo's writings. For the babes, the ascetics who are merely at the elementary stage, Sophia may be the soteriological goal. But they are unprepared for, or incapable of, the intimate relationship with Sophia enjoyed by the wise and


The most notorious by now is the "by light, light" paragraph in Praem. 43-46, from which, of course, comes the title of Goodenough, By Light, Light, which gives an extensive discussion of the function of Sophia as divine light and enlightenment, esp. ch. VI. Cf. Antonie Wlosok, Lektanz und die philosophische Gnosis (Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse 1960, 2; Heidelberg: Winter, 1960) 77-114. Also Franz Norbert Klein, Die Lichtterminologie bei Philon von Alexandrien und in den Hermetischen Schriften (Leiden: Brill, 1962) 11-79. It should be pointed out, however, that "light" is less, rather than more, prominent than some other imagery in Philo's writings.
perfect. The religious content or teaching appropriate to the ascetics or children is the “school studies” as opposed to the true knowledge and wisdom enjoyed by the perfect (e.g., Agr. 8-9; Congr. 19), that is, the milk-like teachings or mere fragrance as opposed to the solid food of Sophia herself (e.g., Mig. 28-33; Fug. 202; Sac. 43-44). The imperfect who only sojourn with Sophia must practice the mundane duties, whereas the perfect and true-born actually dwell with Sophia and possess the perfect virtues (Sac. 43-44). Or, to change the image somewhat, for the babes or practitioners Sophia/Logos is only the teacher, while the perfect possess or dwell in or are married to Sophia/Logos (e.g., Leg. all. 3.1-3; Som. 2.234-36).

Sophia also has quite different effects on the different classes of people. Those who dwell in Sophia have passed beyond the toil necessary for the babes. The former are now immune to ensnaring pleasures of the flesh and need not struggle against the corruptible matters of body and the senses (e.g., Mig. 26-40). For the perfect, who actually dwell together with Sophia as their life-mate, all the influences which would injure the soul cease, whereas they merely diminish in force for those of lesser status who simply sojourn with Sophia (e.g., Som. 2.234-36; Quod Deus. 1-3; Leg. all. 3.131-44). Those who, drinking and being filled with Sophia, are wise and free and rulers, who thus enjoy the divine wealth (Post. 130-39), have completely transcended or rid themselves of the body and earthly influences. Those who have acquired sophia are able to pass beyond the earthly values to the spiritual values of wealth, noble-birth, glory, etc.

Great ventures such as these betoken a celestial and heavenly soul which has left the region of the earth, has been drawn upwards, and dwells with divine natures. For when it takes its fill of the vision of good incorruptible and genuine, it bids farewell to the good which is transient and spurious (Quod Deus 148-51).39

It is thus possession of Sophia that renders one perfect, wise, nobly-born, rich, and kingly in status, that makes one a heavenly and immortal and incorruptible soul. Those who have not attained this substantial relationship with Sophia, however, are still babes living on the milky food of elementary teaching and are mortal insofar as they are still subject to the corruptible bodily and earthly influences. Following our analogy between Philonic writings and the Corinthian “opponents,” the pneumatikos-

39See also esp. Q.G. 4.46; note the similarity of the language in both texts to that of the Corinthians discerned through 1 Cor 15:44-45.
psychikos language used by the latter would appear to have similar connotations with respect to Sophia as both the content and the agent of salvation.

V

The pneumatikos-psychikos terminology so distinctive in 1 Corinthians appears to be quite important in the religious language of the Corinthians whom Paul is addressing. Yet no adequate comparative material has been found from which to establish the precise origin and significance of this unusual terminology. By broadening our approach, however, to include the language to which the pneumatikos-psychikos terminology is parallel in 1 Cor 2:6-3:4 and 15:44-45, there is more than adequate terminological basis for finding in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition represented by Philo an analogy for how all of this religious language functions. Thus the teleios-nēpios contrast, the distinction between the heavenly anthrōpos and the earthly anthrōpos (related respectively to Gen 1:27 and 2:7a), and the pneumatikos-psychikos terminology all can be understood as parallel expressions used by the Corinthians for different levels of spiritual status or different religious types of people. As we might expect in a religious consciousness focused on Sophia as the content and means of salvation, spiritual status and achievement depend on the soul's relation with Sophia. Possession of Sophia means perfection and immortality for the soul and provides one with all the spiritual benefits and security symbolized by "noble birth," "wealth," "kingship," etc. Those who were still struggling with the milk-like nourishment of elementary doctrines did not share this intimacy with Sophia. For these "children" or "earthly ones" or psychikoi were still in need of instruction and exhortation in order to make progress toward perfection. In their lower religious status they were susceptible to corruptible earthly and bodily influences. In contrast stood the "perfect" or pneumatikoi, who, by having found their true incorruptible identity in the heavenly anthrōpos or by virtue of their possession of Sophia, far transcended the corruptible and threatening conditions of earthly reality.

It is difficult, on the basis of Paul's formulations in 1 Cor 2:10-16 and 12:4-11; 14:2, 12, etc., to determine whether the Corinthians were thinking in terms of the pneuma. Determination of this may not be very important for the purposes of this essay, however, since in our Hellenistic Jewish analogy the soteriological functions of the Spirit are always parallel to or identical with those of Sophia/Logos, as, e.g., in Wis 7:22-30; Her. 259-66; Gig. 27, 47; Quod Deus 1-3.